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There is an encroaching crisis in the supply and demand of aviation maintenance labor. This paper reports results of a survey of FAA-licensed A&P schools and a survey of airlines and major maintenance outsourcing firms. Results largely confirm general expectations. Further analysis found indications of an impending shakeout in the extant training idi-astructure. Strategies centered on tapered vertical integration are offered as an admittedly imperfect industry-wide solution.
Trends in the civil air transport (airline) industry make clear that rapid growth is practically inevitable. Because of factors such as the spread of fie-market philosophies and the consequent globalization of industries in general, it has been predicted that the total miles flown will rise rapidly in the foreseeable future ("Service," 1998) . This has driven a rise in demand for new aircraft, but the rising demand for new aircraft far exceeds the manufacturing sector's ability to keep up, and many airlines now ordering new aircraft must wait years for delivery ("Manufacturing," 1998) . Consequently, the already aged and continuously ageing worldwide fleet will be taxed by an increasing number of operating hours and cycles which, in addition to number of aircraft and preventive maintenance requirements, are main strategic predictors of aircraft maintenance (Friend, 1992) .
Looking ahead in t m s of maintenance, then, it at first seems f m t e that a state of immense industry maintenance fscilrty overcapacity currently exists, and will continue to exist (Ionides, 1999) . By one estimate, the current worldwide demand for maintenance senices is about 58 million laborhours, while the industry is actively providing about 77 million, with a current possible total capacity of 155 million labor-hours in the industry is available. In the year 2005, demand is forecasted to be about 79.5 million labor-hours, while total industry capacity will still exceed 181 million labor-hours (McKenna & Scott, 1997) .
But apparently, cclabor-hours" as a measure of industry capacity has more to do with physical plant than actual labor. Forecasts also indicate that over the same period, the supply of mechanics with Air&ame and Powerplant (A&P) Certificates might become very strained, with some areas already reporting diEculties finding skilled mechanics and (Gallacher, 1999; Shay, 1999) . W e ihe growth in demand for A&Ps between now and 2004 is estimated to be close to 34,000, atlrition alone is expected to be about 40,000 (Jackman, 1996) . Though there is probably enougb training capacity to support the industry, it is less certain that the right structure of incentives exists to draw in the needed new technicians in the near h e . Also, these aggregate figures do not take into account obvious heterogeneities in supply and demand such as match-ups among, for example, specific skills of individuals and related requirements of specific organizations.
Thus, ironically, airline maintenance organizations as well as independent providers of outsourced Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) services, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), and other recent entrants into the MRO field look to become squeezed by the pressure to achieve and maintain high rates of asset utilization (in periods of overcapacity, typically accomplished through lowering one's prices), and the pressure to maintain desired levels and types of maintenance skills and resulting service quality. What this shortage forebodes is a supplier's market w k e the price of maintenance labor will likely be bid upwards. In other words, maintenance organizations will likely find themselves competing with each other for the right technicians (exacerbating their direct and some indirect labor costs,) while at the same time the prices these providers will be able to charge their customers for maintenance services will simultaneously be pressured to fall as long as aggregate maintenance overcapacity exists. This condition, of course, will be present in an environment that is already very competitive in more ordinary terms ("MRO Competition," 1996) .
In the United States, at least, many people feel that unrestrained fiee market forces will ultimately resolve dilemmas of this type. For example, one might assume that the coming dsparity between the demand for maintenance labor and its supply will bid up the average wage for maintenance services, and that this should directly incentivize a correct rate of entry by people of the right skills fiom the general working population, and that labor supply and demand will equilibrate in textbook fashion, right on time. On the other hand it could also be argued that airworthiness is something of a public good, and that an optimal strategy for the airline industry at-large would involve innovations that improve the productivity of the existing workforce. Such changes could include equipment upgrades @lanes and engines) that improve the reliabilities of the equipment and decrease the need for basic maintenance, andlor make proactive improvements to the existing industry training idfastructure that produces maintenance technicians.
In short, it is perhaps the case that conditions of poor, problematic, or just heterogeneous maintenance quahty among maintenance providers in the airline industry do not enhance overall industry vitality. At some point in the debate, many feel that cooperation, rather than (or in addition to) canpetition, is a more enlightened tack. Indeed, it has become plain that in some aspects of business, cooperation through hsimnents such as consortia, alliances, and more permanent forms of partnering has become popular, profitable, and conducive to the greater socioeconomic good, even in areas traditionally earmarked by stiff competition (Philips, 1997) .
These perspectives are obviously arguable, even among professional economists and public policy practitioners. It is not the authors' immediate purpose to participate in a theoretical advancement of the argument, but to accept the reality of the encroaching problem and present the initial results of a research collaboration between two institutions in the airline industry maintenance training idiastructure. Observing developments in this collaboration, even fiom the earliest phases, will h o p e m contribute to the ongoing resolution of the labor shortages and skill heterogeneity in the industry. After all, the best managers foresee problems and have solutions ready when difliculties arrive.
THE STUDY
Researchers in the Business Administration Department at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University were approached by a major U.S. airline to help investigate the nature of a forecasted shortfall of Ahfiame and Powerplant (A&P) mechanics, expected to become especially critical for that airline around the year 2000. At that time the airline expects that about 25% of the maintenance workfbrce will attrit or retire; especially retire, meaning that the proportion of experience lost would be even worse. Up to 42% of related management could be lost. These trends were known to be determined by internal labor market factors which were largely beyond any realistic control, so management at the airline opted to search for howledge about external patterns which could contain opportunities for innovative solutions.
The research was lead by a Professor of Marketing and Business Research Methods, who organized graduate students enrolled in an MBA in Aviation course, into teams which performed highly structured telephone surveys. The survey instruments were developed in consulation with: (1) the airline, represented by a former line technician and A&P holder now a financial analyst and a representative fiom the Human Resources department specializing in technician employment (2) a Professor of Strategic Management who is an instructor in the area of Aviation Maintenance Mangement and former Air Force Oacer responsible for engine maintenance programs; (3) students in the class, which included two A&P holders, one an avionics instructor at the university and (4) and a review of the applied and trade literature.
Two telephone surveys were conducted in the Spring of 1998. The first queried airlines as well as major providers of outsourced aircraft maintenance. Participants were identified before the research began on the basis of market share and total volume in consultation with the airline representative. The general purpose was to ascertain current A&P labor conditions and associated expectations. This was a survey of labor.
The second survey queried institutions granting A&P certificates and conducting related maintenance training consistently over a period of 20 years. FAA Advisory Circulars since 1979 were canvassed for this purpose, the latest being AC 147-2DD issued in March 1997. The general putpose was to (a) rea&m the FAA census, and (b) ascertain the nature of the current maintenance training infrastructure. This, in essence, was a survey of some of the characteristics of the supply of A&P labor. Results are described in the following section.
RESULTS
The folowing caniers agreed to participate in the survey of A&P labor demand: Alaska Airlines American Airlines America West Airlines Continental Airlines words, participation was enthusiastic, but not all firms would or could hazard an answer to each question. However, summary participation in each question was very high, so slight variations do not threaten the modest purposes of this Paper. Table One and Table Two presents results of both surveys. Some edrhng of the questions was needed to be concise here, but the tables capture the intent of each question as asked on the survey hstmment The Tables present the questions in the order they were asked during the phone interview. Information not indicated in the tables (as noted) is as follows.
In the survey of demand (' Table One ), in question 4 @o you confer A&P licenses?), it was interesting that three carriers required trainees to successfully complete training within a specified time frame; specifically, two carriers required comuletion within six months. and one within 18 months. Delta Airlines
DHL Airways
Four outsourcing h n s that conferred A&P licenses also gave Northwest Airline Southwest Airlines trainees deadlines; specifically; one required completion Trans World Airlines United Parcel Service US Airways within six months, two within 12 months, and one within 24 Air Tran Airways Hawaiian Airlines Midwest Airlines months. With respect to questions five and six, firms were Reno Air Horizon Air permitted to spec@ more than one main source of A&P Business Emress Ever~een applicants, and more than one target of A&P recruiting, so
The following maintenance providers (outsourcing firms) also agreed to participate:
Aero Corporation
Aero In participating in the survey, there was some slight variation in which firms answered which questions. In other percatages total above 100. With respect to questions 1 1, 12, and 13, participants were encouraged to make additional comments. Ofthose fums that chose to commenf criticisms of new hires (question 1l)'tended to focus on overall inexperience, low skill levels, and lack of needed specialized skills. Comments about other noticeable problems (question 12) tended to focus again on lack of experience, and a lack of avionics and electrical skills. Further elaborations (question 14) repeated these themes, plus evidenced general concerns about present supplyldemand imbalances (overall A&P shortages), devolving skill levels, and the siphoning off of the best talent to the largest operators.
SURVEY ANALYSIS
Demand. Even a cursory examination of the questionnaire data yielded interesting results. First, and as probably would be erqpected, the airlines were much larger organizations than the outsourcing firms, measured as the mean number of mechanics and A&Ps; 2,8 17 mechanics and 1,920 A&Ps for the airlines to 318 mechanics and 203 A&Ps, for the MROfhms. hportantly, such a difference in size is indicative of an imbalance in the bargaining power for labor, much favoring the airlines.
Standard statistical tests were used to gain a better understanding of the differences in other data. Percentages of yeslno m e r s were evaluated as tests of standardized fiequencies using the chi-square statistic (Lapin, 1981) . Differences between population means were evaluated by employing the Student t statistic, in a method specifically suited for small sample sizes. The most conservative assumptions were made; i.e., tests were two-tailed (Lapin, 1981) . The airlines and the outsourcing firms were found to be significantly different in the following ways. On balance, the pattern indicates that the airlines are willing to exercise their bargaining power:
--Question 1: In contrast to what the large differences in means (2,817 v. 3 18, and 1,920 v. 203) might intuitively indicate, airlines employed mechanics at only a slightly higher rate (t = 2.25, greater than the threshhold of 2.048 at alpha = .25). The rate at which the two groups employed A&Ps was, actually, very marginally nonsigdicant (t = 1.90, ~2.056). While the means indicated an extreme difference, in other words, small sample sizes and wide variances around the means made the "apparent," wide differences between statistically non-signdicant.
--Question 2 : Outsourcing firms were slightly less likely to perceive self miliciency (at df = 1 and alpha = .05, the chi-squared threshold was 3.841; chi-squared = 4.00).
--Question 3 : The airlines were much more highly unionized (chi-squared = 43.12).
--Question 4: Airlines were much more likely to require applicants to possess licenses (chi-squared = 43.12).
--Question 5: Because of the "in-house" category (1 1 % for airlines and 42% for outsourcing firms), the main source of job applicants was likely to be different (at df = 4 the threshold was 9.488; chi-squared = 19.36).
--Question 6: Because of the "VoTech category (61% for airlines and 25% for oursourcing firms), recruiting patterns were likely to be different (at df = 8 the threshold was 15.507; chi-squared = 38.55).
--Question 7: The airlines were more likely to require a written employment exam (chi-squared = 33.76).
--Question 13 : Oursourcing firms were slightly more likely to foresee an increase in the future demand for A&Ps (chi-squared = 6.18).
--Question 16: Outsourcing firms were slightly more likely to have plans for conducting in-house training of A&Ps (chi-squared = 6.40).
The two populations were not found to be sigmticantly different in terms of --Question 2: The number of additional A&Ps needed (t = 1.67, <2.160).
--Question 8: Requirements for a practical exam (chi-squared = .04).
--Question 9: Requirements for a probationary period (chi-squared = .30).
--Question 10: Base and overtime pay (t= 1.08 for both parts, <2.056 and 2.093, respectively).
--Question 11: Perceptions of problems with the skills and knowledge of new-hires (chi-squared = 4.50).
--Question 12: Perceptions of other problems with new-hires (chi-squared = 1.56).
--Question 13: Percentage increase in A&Ps forecasted (t = 1.56,<2.056).
--Question 15: The presence of training partnerships and alliances (chi-squared = 1.54).
--Question 17: Percent of applicants passing initial job screening (t = 1.16, ~2.048).
Supply.
Refening to the results of the questio~aire w e n to the Part 147 Schools (Table Two) , it was interesting that an overwhelming number of schools provide what seem to be generalist A&P licenses, in the sense that almost 85% c a n f d only A&P li-, while much smaller percentages offered only an "A," a "P," or all three possibilities of A, P, and A&P. More telling, perhaps, was that only about 28% t a i l d their programs to speci6c clients; and here, it is worth nolingthat most of this percentage was really only "specific" to categories of clients (such as airlines or general aviation), not specific organizations. In light of the demand described above, such an aggregate lack of focus could indicate a suboptimal degree of "closeness to the customer," or comhation with the needs of the consumers of maintenance labor -despite a contradictory conclusion which might be inferred from noting that about half maintained training partnershipS/alliances, and internshipslco-op programs.
There were signs of stability and uniformity in the training infrastructure. Over 90% of new A&Ps were evidently coming fiom a concentration of three m& sources: in order, Community Colleges, VoTech schools, and Universities. Almost two-thirds of the sample were state-supported. Again, about half had internshiplco-op programs, 88% offered h c i a l asistance programs, and 9 1 % offered job placement assistance. Most (85%) foresaw an increase in future enrohent.
More worrisome was the variation in exam pass rates and rates. The exam pass rate varied fiom 15% to loo%, with a mean of 92.2%. The attrition rate varied fiom 0% to 90%, with a mean of 19%. The observer is immediately compelled to speculate as to some of the possible causes of such variatian, given the high level of guidance and oversight provided by the FAA. For example, some schools could be much more H c u l t than others for a wide variety of reasons; andlor schools could vary considerably in their quality. Or large heterogeneities could exist in student populations, though this seems more doubtfid. Other reasons could exist as well. Otherwise, there were additional signs of fkagmentation and wide variation in the training infrastructure. Most telling was that the largest school was delivering about 350 A&Ps a year, or about .03% of the 1 1,000 A&Ps which enter the field annually ("Pilots," 1993). Most other schools were much smaller stiU. Very few, then, could be theoretically ascribed much bargaining power, but it must be conceded that it might be senseless to allude to the bargaining power of schools since individuals, not schools, bargain for the sale of maintenance labor. On the other hand, it is within the first author's professional interest to be well aware of just how much common sense A&P trainees employ in making careful and calcuhhg evaluations of which schools are worth attending, so the point is much the same.
One-fifth of the sample was tuition-driven; tuition ranged widely fiom $500 to $32,000, with a mean of about $6,864. The duration of programs ranged fiom 10 months to 60 months, with a mean of 22.4 months. Experience in training in aviation maintenance ranged from 1 to 70 years, with a mean of 3 1.3. Class sizes ranged fiom about 4 to 50; some schools employed only part-time instructors, while other schools employed only full-time instructors. However, it might be a matter of perspective as to whether these conditions represent a lack of coordination and standardization, or merely a healthy variety. If the latter is assumed, however, then it becomes puzzling why only 28% tailor their programs to specific clients. DISCUSSION This paper opened with a general description of the muchimproved health of the aviation industry as a whole, but quickly pointed to an impending shakeout in MRO because of a squeeze between intense pressures to economize versus escalating labor costs. The data suggests that the training infrastructure, as well, may be poised for a similar shakeout, or at least a rationalization and restruc!m-ing. The reasoning follows, with alternative strategies for its management.
Though the demand for A&P mechanics may become critical in the future, that situation has not yet arrived. In the near-term, it looks as if maintenance schools will continue to struggle for enrollment. The finding that 85% of schools foresee an increase in near-texm enrollment may contain an optimistic bias. At least, the airlines and maintenance outsourcing fums were not nearly as optimistic that they would be able to satisfy their future needs. Of course, it may simply be that the demand is rising faster than the supply is rising (but that both are indeed rising), which would accommodate everyone's predictions. But another (or additional) possibility is to fist note that the number of schools has begun to decline. The recent population of schools may have been as high as 220 (USDOT & FAA, 1993) . In 1994 the number of reported Part 147 schools was 193. That number has since decreased and the most recent data indicated 185 schools remaining, and the phone survey found two more schools poised to exit. So if the demand for technicians is rising, the decline in the number of schools warrants an explanation.
Understanding some of the more classic dynarmcs of industry evolution helps (Porter, 1980) . When industriedmarkets are growing, it is normal for individual f m s to do what is necessary to grasp larger portions of market share, or to at least keep up with industry growth at least in absolute terms. However, when industrylmarket growth eventually subsides, and providers of resources to that market continue to expand, the aggregate capacity in the supply of resources eventually exceeds aggregate market demand, leaving the supplier industry at-large in a condition of overcapacity. Wdiug up a stable market among providers who, on average, have more capacity than the market has demand, leaves providers in a bad cost crunch. Earlier, it was described how MRO firms are in such a situation.
Very similar forces apply to the training inf.?astructure that supplies MRO with labor; except a shakeout due to poor cap* dkation looks like it will be caused by the scarcity of raw materials (students), rather than a paucity in demand. But there is more. Conditions are changing in ways that suggest that the major employers of A&Ps are not willing to settle for poorly trained mechanics, almost no matter how scarce they might become. Classically, when "buyers" (in this case, airlines and outsourcing firms) are sophisticated (as, apparently, are recruiters and human resources personnel) and can make h etuned assessments of the VALUE of resources being acquired (in this case, new A&Ps), two generic types of firms (in this case, schools) tend to survive; firm that are poised to deliver high-quality, high.-differentiated, high-value-added products/services, and those that are poised to undercut everyone else in terms of cost, and generaIly price (Porter, 1985) . The providers (schools) which can not deliver either high-qdtylhigh-maentiation-at-a-g-price, OR a lowcost, ostensibly low-price gdservice, are positioned to fail and exit.
In short, buyers (airlines and other consumers of maintenance labor) should be expected to rationalize-out the overcapacity (of schools) over time, forcing the relatively poor value-adders (mediocre schookr) to exit.
This may be what has already begun to occur in the A&P training Sastructure. As the supply of people entering the A&P field falls, but as the demand rises, increasingly sophisticated reading efforts of the airlinedothers should be expected to target what each firm, given its challenges and strategy, will deem appropriate value in a new-hire. One can not assert with much confidence that airlines and major outsourcing firms will do nothing about the impending labor crisis except preparing to outbid one another. Wisely focusing on value, not volume, at least some will be keenly interested in hirjllg only the best mechanics, adjusting to remaining labor inadequacies by substituting inferior-quality labor for technological improvements in the inherent maintainability of equipment (and, ultimately, dispatch reliability), andfor by making managerial innovations that improve the productivity of the maintenance workforce.
In other words, the nature of the demand indicated in these m e y s indicates that buyers of maintenance services are not interested in just getting "warm bodies." Respondents consistently voiced as much, if not more, concerns about the shills and competencies of future technicians as about the potential number of technicians. As one might expect, the airlines, firms with deeper pockets and better bargaining positions for labor, showed less anxiety than the outsourcing firms. Several long-tenn results of this situation should be, to those who have faith in the invisible hand of the forces behind supply and demand, that (a) on the demand side, there will continue to be a siphoning-off of the best talent to the airlines and other areas where the need for maintenance labor is highly concentrated in pwerful f i r m s (consolidating, global players in MRO, OEMs, etc.) , and @) on the supply side, either the highest-quality, or the most cost-effective schools (or perhaps both, if ingeniously managed) should sunrive an encroaching shakeout which, as stated, may have already begun. In the long run, the high-costhigh-value-adding schools may gravitate to serving the airlines, while the low-cost schools may gravitate to general aviation and less-wealthy aviation segments. It is arguable, however, whether this is socioeconomically optimal. Maybe the best mechanics should go to the firms with the greatest exposure to the general public, and that this should actually be encouraged. Or, one might argue, ordinary market dynamics should be left to sort it out, and that there should be no additional institutional creation impeding equal access to labor markets. In a way, the issue seems to revolve around equality (equal access), and equity (fairness on all accounts), which can not be decided here.
At any rate, schools may be individually correct that future enrollment will increase, but if this is mostly because other schools are simply exiting the training ~astructure. The situation may not necessarily be that the total supply of mechanics will increase, or that the benefits will be equitably disstbuted throughout the industry. But, as some schools and institutions leave the field, others now see a chance for their enr011ements to increase. Short of being able to significantly alter the aggregate number or the quality of the people interested in becoming aviation mechanics, the authors suggest that one way to embark upon a less painful rationalization of the extant t r h g infrastructure is for the demand-side to consider verticallbackward integration, or at Ieast tapered or quasiintegration, and for the supply-side to do some keen analysis of the value they individually deliver, and hone products to the demands of most likely buyers, for example through more focused curricula and partnering (complementary forward integration).
Baclcward integration refers to any decision aimed at restructuring an arrangement with me's suppliers that attempts to reduce supply-related uncertaiuties. Outright aqukhon of one's supplier is one example, as is deciding to enter the upstream business through internal growth. Of the known possible benefits of vertical integration, some that seem to especially pertain to the present situation include: economies of combined operations, improvement in the ab&y to trust the supplier, greater economy of monitoring the supplier for adherence to expectations, better assurance of a steady flow of supply, a reduction in overall slack, reduction in purchasing costs and bargaining, better capital utilization, enhanced ability to fine-tune and differentiate the overall productfservice, and full capturing of the profitability of the supplier. Potential costs include: increased operating leverage (too many eggs in one basket), reduced flexibility to environmental change, capital investment Qustifling hurdle rates and opportunity costs of capital), foreclosure of alternative sources of supply, maintaining balance in potential capacity differentials, dulled marketlconsumer incentives of a captive relationship, the distractioddilutim of managerial talent and organizational competencies, and the possibility of a "bad apple" phenomenon, or the vulnerability to contamination of one organization by another organization's inferior performance standards (Porter, 1980) . But organizations are apt to partially, as well as fully, integrate backward when the combinations of benefits and costs suggest it. Tapered integration generally refers to a strategy of becommg one's own supplier, but not supplying all of one's own demand (as opposed to full integration).
Potential advantages include a lower elevation of fixed costs, reduced risks of locking-in to one supplier, the maintenance of some market discipline on the captive supplier, the development of a detailed understanding of relevant costs, and the ability to still externalize the risks of fluctuations in demand (Porter, 1980) . For example, an airline could acquire an existing Part 147 school (and in impending conditions, at a very attractive price), or open its own training academy, to fulfill its minimum forecasted needs for maintenance labor, accommodating upswings in business cycles through external recruiting -meanwhile tailoring the academy's program to the specific operational requirements of the airline, and making efficient use of everyone's time and other resources.
Quasi-integration has a similar intent, but generally refers to a mutual investment (hence financial stake) between firms who share a common goodwiU, and who contact each other frequently in the natural course of their relationshqs. Advantages, again, can be found in various cost economies, the absence of any necessary exclusive commitment to either supply or purchase, and a lower overall capital investment. For example, a major consumer of maintenance labor might directly invest in an existing school, technically maintaining its business independence but otherwise enjoying the benefits of a very high level of cooperation and coordination, all lubricated most importantly by mutual goodwill. Given the mutual goodwill that obviously exists between the training ~astructure and its customer base, quasi-integration might be the theoretically more correct paradigm to pursue. Obviously, since each consumer of maintenance labor is potentially idiosyncratic, and as there seems to be so much variation in the supplier base, permutations of solutions are almost endless. It is left to individual strategists to consider their own requirements.
In addition to achieving firm-level benefits, the industry as a whole might benefit from a trend towards forward and backward integration. Overall training capacity could be maintained, instead of severely shaken-out and generally injured in the short-term, to the detriment of being able to satisfy long-term growth in demand. But remaining capacity could be rationalized around, and tailored to, the specitic needs of buyers, on a case-bycase basis, rather than providing an undershd population of genedkts who apparently are not optimally valuable new-hires.
However, caveats are c e r k d y in order as well. As stated ealier, a a d toward integration could leave the consumers of maintenance labor who do not have the ability to integrate in an only greater predicament. General aviation and tked-base operators may become particularly strained, or economically locked-out fimn fair access to the high-costlhigh-value adding schools, settling to recruit at what has sometimes been referred to as the "diploma mills" ("A Greater," 1996) . CONCLUSION Globalization will continue to change the structure of the aviation industry at many points of value-addition throughout its complete supply chain. Educationltraining is a supplier industry that is just as vulnerable to the forces of supply and demand as its downstream customers. In addition to globalization drivers, the simple scarcity of a key resource -skilled labor -will shape industry restructuring as well. l'roponents of "free madcet" solutions should be aware that the smartest entrepreneurs respond proactively to foreseeable changes; they do not wait for gross dis-equilibria to trigger reactive equilibration, at serious socio-economic cost. 
